We study incentive alignment for the coordination of operations in humanitarian settings. Our research focuses on transportation, the second largest overhead cost to humanitarian organizations after personnel.
Introduction
The need for humanitarian action has increased dramatically in the last few decades and it is expected to rise significantly in the years to come (Thomas and Kopczak 2005) . Organizations carrying out humanitarian action face serious challenges to deliver the right goods and services to the right people at the right time and at the right cost (Van Wassenhove 2006) . Transportation, the second largest overhead cost to international humanitarian organizations after personnel (Disparte 2007) , offers interesting research opportunities to improve operational efficiency. Improvements in transportation and fleet management translate in better attention to beneficiaries.
We study the field vehicle fleet management system in International Humanitarian Organizations (IHO). This research focuses on 4x4 light vehicles, the most widely used vehicles to coordinate and execute last mile distribution. The last stage of the humanitarian supply chain, last mile distribution relates to the delivery of humanitarian goods and services to beneficiaries in field operations (Balcik et al 2008) .
Our research is motivated by a larger field project to understand field vehicle fleet management in IHO. In the following we will briefly describe the project and use our findings from the field research to motivate the theoretical model that is studied in this paper. The field project includes four large IHO: the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), the World Food Programme (WFP) and World Vision International (WVI). Staff interviews were conducted at the Headquarter in Europe, at national and field office levels in the Middle East and Africa for the various IHO. Typically, the fleet management system in large IHO has three decision making parties during the planning stage of development programs: the Humanitarian Programs, the National Logistics and the Headquarter.
Humanitarian Programs are the primary delivery channel of humanitarian aid for the IHO. Often located in remote areas of developing countries (the field), Programs are service oriented. They provide assistance and help alleviating the suffering of people in the aftermath of disasters (relief).
Also, Programs implement activities to improve the quality of life of poor communities (development). Transportation requirements for relief and development are different. Relief Programs assign vehicles according to emergency priorities for disaster assessment, or to coordinate search, rescue and emergency aid distribution operations. Development Programs use vehicles for regular visits to villages or refugee camps for health care or to coordinate aid distribution. Urgency in development Programs is lower and vehicles are typically assigned to visits in order of requisition.
We focus on fleet management in development Programs with big fleets of twenty or more vehicles in the same geographic location. Development Programs are henceforth referred to as Programs.
Some examples of Programs include health, nutrition, water and sanitation. In terms of transportation, the objective of Programs is to have a vehicle available when it is required by the staff to visit beneficiaries. Although speed in demand fulfillment is not necessarily critical, Programs must meet demand in a reasonable time. Due to the long term nature of Programs, visits that cannot be performed on time are accumulated. Programs incur two main costs, the cost of delay and the cost of managing their fleets in the field. Often Program managers are more sensitive to the cost of delay than to the fleet management cost. The bigger the fleet the lower the cost of delay. During the planning stage, Programs state their transportation needs to the National Logistics.
The National Logistics, henceforth referred to as Logistics, compile the Programs' stated transportation needs and make fleet requisitions to the Headquarter. The Logistics are instrumental to the implementation of fleet management policies and procedures. Located in urban centers in the countries of operation, the Logistics are accountable for the running cost of the fleet. The running cost includes maintenance, repairs and fuel consumption. To keep the cost low, during the planning stage the Logistics decide whether to monitor the Programs' stated needs or to approve the stated needs. Monitoring is expensive. It consists of setting up information systems and sending staff to the field to verify the Programs' stated transportation needs. Programs keep good data records, usually in printed files or in non-standardized spreadsheets, mainly for audit purposes . Via in situ monitoring the Logistics can get an accurate estimation of transportation needs of the Programs before sending fleet requisitions to the Headquarter.
The Headquarter has the function of procuring the fleet requested by the Logistics. Located in the US or Europe, the Headquarter's objective is balancing the cost of delay of last mile distribution and the operating cost of the fleet, i.e. the fleet management cost plus the running cost. During the planning stage, the Headquarter decides the optimal fleet size to minimize the system's cost. The fleet size includes a fleet buffer to guarantee that a reasonable proportion of visits will not suffer any delay. The fleet buffer determines the service level of the fleet. The bigger the fleet buffer the lower the cost of delay but the higher the operating cost of the fleet.
As described earlier, the organizational structure of the IHO creates a decentralized system with misaligned incentives. Due to the service orientation of the Programs, they may prefer having a larger fleet size than the system's optimal level. The problem of misaligned incentives gives rise to an adverse selection due to asymmetry in information in such a system. While the Headquarter and the Logistics may have probabilistic estimates of the true transportation needs of the Programs, they may not be able to accurately determine the true needs unless they incur an expensive monitoring effort. The monitoring decision is made by the Logistics, that has a sole purpose of minimizing the running cost of the fleet and the cost of monitoring. The Headquarter due to its location cannot monitor the fleet requisition made by the Programs and must trust the Logistics for the stated demand. The Headquarter determines the fleet size based on the transportation needs compiled by the Logistics and a predetermined buffer level to absorb demand and service-time variability in the system. The incentives problem is illustrated by quotes from our interviews. One of the Headquarter staff said: "I feel some of our programs have more vehicles than required"
In fact, one of the Global Fleet Managers we interviewed estimates that their Programs have between 10% and 15% more vehicles than required. A Logistics staff member in Mozambique stated:
"We do not have effective monitoring tools to control Program fleets"
In contrast, when we asked about the fulfilment of his transportation needs, a Program relief worker in Mozambique said: "We do not have enough vehicles. Often we have to wait too long to have a vehicle available to go to the field"
We show why, from their own perspective, the three concerns are justified. Then, we focus our effort on the coordination of the fleet management system. But coordinating this system is challenging since standard financial incentives based mechanisms are not considered viable in the humanitarian setting. This is primarily due to the organizational culture of the IHO, wherein the employees are driven by their motivation to serve and not by objectives such as profit maximization (Lindenberg 2001 , Manell 2010 . E.g., it is almost inconceivable for the IHO to incentivize volunteer medical doctors working in the field by using financial penalties and rewards. We believe that this unique characteristic of humanitarian organizations makes the incentive misalignment issue an extremely interesting research topic, and not just a mere application of the principal agent framework from the economics literature.
Instead of using mechanisms based on traditional financial incentives we propose an operational mechanism to coordinate the system. We use the fleet buffer decided by the Headquarter as an operational lever to achieve truth revelation from Programs in terms of transportation needs. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt of using an operational capacity based mechanism to coordinate a principal-agent system. Our work should specially appeal to the Operations Management community as it showcases the strategic importance of operational design, beyond the objective to achieve tactical efficiency in the humanitarian sector.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 positions the paper in the literature. Section 3 describes the IHO fleet management system. Section 4 introduces the operational capacity based mechanism. Section 5 extends the analysis via numerical experiments. Finally, section 6 presents the conclusions and further research agenda.
Literature Review
Our paper contributes to the humanitarian logistics literature and to the incentives alignment literature in operations management. The extant literature on humanitarian logistics follows a classical optimization approach. Most of the research examines relief systems for disaster preparedness or for disaster response. Typically, those papers apply operations research techniques to relief operations taking a central planner approach. The objective can be equity or cost-efficiency oriented.
Equity-based objective functions have been studied in terms of time of response and demand fulfilment. Research to minimize the time of response can be found in Chiu and Zheng (2007) and Campbell et al (2008) . Research exploring demand coverage include Batta and Mannur (1990) , Ozdamar et al (2004) , Jia et al (2007) , De Angelis et al (2007) , Yi and Ozdamar (2007) , Saadatseresht (2009) and Salmeron and Apte (2010) .
Cost-based objective functions are often represented either via monetary cost or via travel distance. Cost minimization can be found in the work of Barbarosoglu et al (2002) , Barbarsoglu and Arda (2004) , Beamon and Kotleba (2006) and Sheu (2007) . Distance traveled minimization has been explored by Cova and Johnson (2003) , Chang et al (2007) , and Stepanov and Smith (2009) .
In their work, Stepanov and Smith also examine an equity based function of time of response. Regnier (2008) models the trade-off between cost and equity in hurricane evacuation operations, also from a central planner perspective.
In contrast to the extant literature in humanitarian logistics we analyze the trade-off equity/efficiency in a decentralized system using a principal-agent approach. In our model the Program has private information regarding its transportation needs. Also, different agents control the two components of the cost function. While the Logistics are responsible for the running cost of the fleet, the Program is responsible for the fleet management cost in the field and incurs the disutility due to delay in reaching their beneficiaries. At the top of the system, the Headquarter's problem is to balance the operating cost of the fleet with the equity cost represented by cost of delay while keeping the system's incentives aligned.
The incentives literature has focused on exploring manufacturing and service operations management in "for profit" settings. Typically, decisions in manufacturing supply chains relate to order-quantity of goods while decisions in service supply chains relate to the capacity of the service system. Most of the mechanisms for supply chain coordination in manufacturing and in service operations management are based on financial incentives.
In this paragraph we briefly summarize some commonly studied financial contracts in manufacturing and service supply chains. This is not a comprehensive list of the vast literature on supply chain contracts, but it provides the readers a primer on the nature of contracts that have been studied in such settings. In revenue sharing contracts a retailer pays a supplier a wholesale price for each unit purchased plus a percentage of the revenue generated by the retailer (Cachon and Lariviere 2005) . Buy-back contracts have a wholesale price and a buy-back price for unsold goods (Pasternack 1985) . In Sales-rebates contracts the supplier charges the retailer a per-unit wholesale price but gives the retailer a rebate per unit of goods sold above a predefined threshold (Krishnan et al 2001 , Taylor 2002 . In quantity discount contracts the retailer receives a discount either on all units if the purchased quantity exceeds a threshold (all-unit quantity discount) or on every additional unit above a threshold (incremental quantity discount) (Corbett and de Groote 2000, Cachon and Terwiesch 2009) . In price-discount contracts wholesale prices are discounted on the basis of annual sales (Bernstein and Federgruen 2003) . In service systems decisions are based on capacity. For instance, Hasija et al (2008) explore pay-per-call and pay-per-time contracts in call-centers. In the first type of contracts the vendor earns a fixed fee from the client for each served phone call. In the second type of contracts the vendor is paid per unit of time spent serving customers. In this service setting as in the previous manufacturing ones coordination is achieved via financial transfer payments.
In their path breaking work Su and Zenios (2006) explore the efficiency-equity trade-off in kidney transplantation. In their setting financial transfers are not possible. Instead, they propose a kidney's allocation rule based on the fact that lower-risk patients are willing to spend more time waiting in order to receive organs of higher quality. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper using an operational mechanism instead of a financial mechanism for incentive coordination in operations management. Following Su and Zenios, our paper proposes an operational mechanism for incentive coordination. Nevertheless, our work is substantially different from the one of Su and Zenios. First, our research is based on a humanitarian fleet management setting. Second, instead of an allocation rule we propose a capacity (fleet buffer) rule for fleet coordination. Third, in the work of Su and Zenios there are prevailing information rents while in our research we show the existence of natural truth revelation.
Our contribution is twofold. First, we depart from the standard central planning assumption in humanitarian logistics by analyzing a decentralized setting using principal-agent models. Second, this is the first paper using an operational capacity based mechanism for coordination in operations management ( To capture the stochasticity of the system, and the nature of work accumulation when Programs face a fleet shortage, we use a queueing model. The use of queueing models for vehicle fleet management systems is well established in the literature. Queueing models have been used for analyzing police patrol systems (Green 1984 , Green and Kolesar 1984a ,b, 1989 , fire departments Blum 1973, Ignall et al 1982) , helicopter fire fleets (Bookbinder and Martell 1979) , and ambulance fleets (Singer and Donoso 2008) . These papers model the needs for transportation using stochastic inter-arrival times.
We 
The Headquarter
The Headquarter has the function of balancing the system costs. These costs include the running cost of the fleet, the fleet management cost in the field, and the cost of delay. The running cost, r > 0, is the average running cost per vehicle per unit of time. It includes maintenance, repairs, and fuel costs. The Logistics are accountable for r.
The fleet management cost, c > 0, is the average management cost per vehicle per unit of time.
Pedraza find that Programs are accountable for c. Often senior humanitarian staff in the field dedicate a proportion of their time to fleet scheduling and routing, depending on the fleet size. The fleet management cost also includes the cost of vehicle drivers as well as the cost of information systems and spreadsheets to track fleet scheduling and routing in the field. We refer to c + r as the operating cost of the fleet.
The cost of delay, w, is the cost per visit per unit of time. The Programs incur the cost of delay.
Although the cost of delay is not a cash cost to the Programs, they incur a disutility associated with delay in carrying out their activities. To simplify our analysis and analytically capture both the disutility of delay and the tensions of this decentralized system we assume a constant marginal cost.
To balance the system costs, i.e. the operating cost and the cost of delay, the Headquarter decides on the fleet size. Denoted by the Greek letter γ, the fleet buffer is the number of vehicles in excess of the minimum number λ/µ. The buffer is required to maintain stability of the system due to inherent variability in inter-arrival and service times. In other words, the fleet buffer is the extranumber of vehicles needed for protecting the system from stochasticity and achieving a determined service level. The optimal fleet buffer can be obtained via optimization methods by balancing the importance of delays in visits with fleet operating costs. We model the system as an M/M/N queue.
For analytical tractability we use heavy-traffic approximations under the 'rationalized regime' to represent the average delay in the system. In the rationalized regime, the probability of delay asymptotically converges to a value between 0 and 1. The Programs that are assumed in our system neither carry out emergency response activities nor highly scheduled regular work, but carry out delay sensitive and stochastically arriving developmental activities. Therefore we believe that the rationalized regime is appropriate for our setting. Borst et al (2004) show that a simple square-root staffing rule is asymptotically optimal for a system operating in the rationalized regime. Hence we assume the square-root staffing rule to determine the fleet size. The square-root rule can be written Grassmann 1988 , Halfin and Whitt 1981 , Whitt 1992 , Borst et al 2004 , Hasija et al 2005 . Where ρ = λ µ is the utilization rate of the fleet as defined in the queueing literature. The effectiveness of the rule increases in the size of the fleet and it has been shown that it is a robust approximation for the optimal system size of systems of 20 or more servers (vehicles).
We model the system as an Erlang-C system following a first-come first-served queueing discipline. This rule was chosen since, as mentioned before, within Programs all the visits have the same priority. For simplicity, we assume µ = 1, which corresponds to measuring time in the scale of mean service times (Whitt 1992) . Under this assumption we have:
Following Borst et al (2004) and Hasija et al (2005) , for a given fleet buffer γ the average number of visits in the queue is Q(γ, λ) =
. Using the assumption of µ = 1 and replacing F by its definition in (1), we obtain:
The function π(y) is known as the Halfin-Whitt delay function (Halfin and Whitt 1981) . It is an asymptotically exact approximation to the probability of delay, Pr{wait > 0}. The value of π (y) is:
Φ(y) and φ(y) are the unit normal cdf and pdf, respectively. The service level of the fleet, S, i.e.
the average proportion of visits done without delay is S = 1 − π(y).
The Headquarter minimizes the total system cost given by the average cost of delay, wQ(γ, λ), plus the average operating cost of the fleet, (c + r)F (γ, λ). The Headquarter problem is:
Replacing (1) and (2) in (3) we can rewrite the Headquarter problem as:
The cost function (4) is unimodal (Borst et al 2004) and it has a finite and positive minimum value, γ * (c, r, w), which is independent of λ and it only depends on the cost parameters of the system (Hasija et al 2008) ;
is the fleet buffer chosen by the Headquarter.
The Logistics
The Logistics are accountable for the running cost of the fleet which increases with fleet size. Often the Logistics is composed of national staff located in the capital city of the country of operation.
During the planning stage the Logistics compile the Programs' stated transportation needs, denoted byλ. As we will explain later in Section 3.3, the stated transportation needs of the Programs may not be the same as their true transportation needs due to misaligned incentives and private information. The Logistics do not know the true transportation needs, but they have some ideajust not a very accurate one -so we abstract it to two types. We assume that the Logistics has a probabilistic prior belief that:
Where L means low transportation needs, H means high needs, λ L < λ H and the space of types The Logistics' objective is to minimize the expected average fleet cost. The average fleet cost is equal to the average running cost plus the monitoring cost. The Logistics problem can be written as:
The Program
Ranging from basic health care provision to agriculture and building basic infrastructure, the 
Note from (7) that if the low type Program distorts its needs the intended fleet buffer is δ L > γ.
On the other hand, if the high type Program distorts its needs the intended fleet buffer is δ H < γ.
The expected average queue length is:
The Program's objective is to minimize the service cost C P rog (γ, λ i ,λ i ). The i type Program's problem is:
Where
The fleet management system is shown in figure 1.
The first thing to note is that there is no penalty, i.e. the Program's stated transportation needs are independent of the Logistics monitoring effort. This result is formalized in the following proposition. All the proofs are included in the appendix.
Proposition 1. In the current fleet management system the Logistics monitoring effort does not dissuade the Programs from distorting their stated transportation needs.
Proposition 1 is consistent with the worries of the Logistics at the national level. As motivated in the Introduction, the Logistics complains about the lack of effective tools to induce the Programs to report their true transportation needs. To find its optimal fleet buffer the Program solves: 
Logistics' Decision
Figure 1 The field vehicle fleet management system
The optimal fleet buffer for the Program is:
As in equation (5), the optimal fleet buffer for the Program is independent of its transportation needs. It only depends on the cost parameters c and w. This allows us to state a lemma that clearly explains the misalignment of incentives between the Headquarter and the Program.
Lemma 1. γ * (c, r, w) <γ(c, w).
Lemma 1 together with equation (1) imply that the optimal fleet size for the Headquarter is smaller than the optimal fleet size for the Program. This result is consistent with the worries of the Headquarter in terms of oversized fleets and it is also consistent with the worries of the Programs in terms of not having enough vehicles to optimize their service. A graphic representation of the Headquarter cost compared to the Program cost is shown in figure 2.
Current System Solution
The first observation is that in the current system the high type Program always reveals its true transportation needs. This is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the current system C P rog (γ We are left with the low type Program. The low type Program states its true transportation needs as long as
This suggests the existence of a threshold for truth telling, formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. There exists a truth telling thresholdγ L for the low type Program, such that:
, for a fixed value of γ * the truth telling threshold depends on the ratio between λ H and λ L . The result of Proposition 2 and the threshold for truth tellingγ L allow us to solve the current problem using backward induction. The results are summarized in table 3.
In the distortion region (second column in table 3), the optimal monitoring effort occurs when the marginal cost of monitoring equals the extra-cost of fleet excess. In the truth telling region (third column in table 3) there is no need for monitoring. This is because the ratio λ H /λ L is big Table 3 Summary of results for the current system with monitoring enough to guarantee that the Program's savings in cost of delay are overcome by the extra-cost of fleet management. We will come back to the current system with monitoring in our numerical analysis.
An Operational Mechanism Design
In the previous section we showed how our model provides an explanation of the concerns expressed by different staff members of the different parties of the IHO, i.e., the Headquarter, the Logistics, Since financial transfer payments are not implementable in this setting, truth revelation proves to be challenging. In this section we propose a novel mechanism design for truth revelation based on an operational lever, the fleet buffer offered by the Headquarter.
The Headquarter (Principal), commits to a mechanism that allocates the Program (Agent) type i an outcome F , i.e. a fleet size, as a function of the reported type. This is operationalized by the Headquarter committing to an offered fleet buffer, γ i , for the stated transportation need of the Program equal to λ i . The Program reports a type profileλ i ∈ Λ and the mechanism is executed.
The Headquarter's objective is to minimize the system cost for a given distribution of Program types:
The incentive compatibility (IC) constraints consist of offering each Program type i = {L, H} a fleet buffer γ i to guarantee that C P rog (γ i , λ i ) ≤ C P rog (δ i , λ i ). Hence, for each Program type the (IC) constraint would be:
The left hand side of constraint (13) is the i type Program cost with a fleet buffer γ i . The right hand side of (13) represents the cost of the i type Program when distorting its needs. The intended fleet buffer δ i is defined by (7).
In the system we are modeling the Program does not have an outside option since the fleet is procured by the Headquarter. Hence, the individual rationality (IR) constraints are defined by the fact that the Headquarter must offer each Program type a fleet buffer big enough to protect the system from stochasticity, i.e. 0 < γ i . Combining objective (12) with the IC constraints (13) and the IR stability constraints, the mechanism can be stated as:
(IC L ) :
In the proposed mechanism (14) the Logistics is not a strategic decision maker. Instead, the Logistics focus on applying fleet management policies and procedures designed by the Headquarter.
There are two ways of achieving truth revelation via the operational mechanism: induced and natural. Natural truth revelation follows directly from Proposition 3. We will now show that when conditions in Proposition 3 are not met, there exist fleet buffers γ L and γ H such that both Program types have incentives to reveal their true transportation needs. In the case of induced truth revelation we find that the IC constraint of the low type Program will always be binding. Let
There exist two ways of making the low type Program's IC constraint tight. The first way is by forcing γ L = δ L . The second way of making low type Program's IC constraint tight is by choosing
Proposition 4. There exist two regions for induced truth revelation via the operational mechanism as follows: The two regions characterized by Proposition 4 can be depicted in the space defined by the transportation needs ratio and probability types (figure 3). In R1 of Proposition 4 both IC constraints in mechanism (14) are binding. The Headquarter offers
Program types receive the same fleet size, F L = F H . This region exists for values of λ H /λ L close to 1 and limited by T 1 , a threshold implicitly defined by the cost parameters of the system, c, r and w, the lambda ratio, λ H /λ L and the low type probability, q. When parameters fall in R1, truth revelation is achieved by making the low type Program indifferent between reporting its true needs and inflating these needs, i.e. by making the low type IC constraint tight via γ L = δ L . The extra-cost for low type's truth revelation is mitigated by reducing δ L via the decrease of γ H , such that γ H = δ H . In our numerical experiments we find that the cost mitigation is mediated by q, the low type probability. Increasing q after the parameter dependent threshold T 1 reduces the width of R1.
In R2 of Proposition 4 only the IC constraint for the low type Program in (14) 
For large values of q the increase in the likelihood of having low type Programs switches the order of incentives to γ * < γ L < γ H . The closer γ L is to γ * the lower the cost for the headquarter. As mentioned earlier, we find that as q increases, the region R2 becomes more favorable than the region R1. The intuition is straightforward. In R2, F L < F H while in R1, F L = F H . As q increases, the probability of a Program to be of the low type increases. Hence F L < F H becomes a more cost effective mechanism than F L = F H .
The third region in figure 3 , R3, is the region of natural truth revelation. Under some parameter values neither of the Program types has incentives to distort their transportation needs, i.e. there exists a natural truth telling region.
Corollary 1. There exists a "natural truth telling" region for the operational mechanism. R3, the natural truth telling region is defined by γ
In R3, characterized in Corollary 1 both IC constraints are loose. Truth revelation is achieved without the need of incentives. With parameter values falling in this region the low type Program Figure 3 Truth telling regions in the transportation needs ratio and probability type (γH /γL, q) space does not have incentives for distorting its needs, i.e.γ < δ L . If the low type Program inflates its transportation needs, then it gets a fleet big enough to guarantee that the cost of management will overcome the savings in delay. On the other hand, the high type Program does not distort its needs because it would receive a fleet too small for its needs. In this case the cost of delay would overcome the savings in fleet management. It is important to remark that in figure (3) the threshold for natural truth revelation in the mechanism, T 2 equals the truth telling threshold in the current system,γ, defined in Proposition 3. This follows from the fact that the Headquarter's cost function in both formulations is equivalent. It is also interesting that T 2 is independent of q.
It depends on the cost parameters c, r, w, and the λ H /λ L ratio.
Another interesting insight is that the high type Program does not distort its transportation
needs. This is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Under the mechanism the high type Program always reveals its true transportation needs.
In R1 characterized in Proposition 4 the high type Program is indifferent between revealing its true transportation needs and distorting. This is because γ H = δ H . In R2 also characterized in Proposition 4 the high type Program is better of by revealing its true transportation needs since condition δ H < γ H <γ implies C P rog (γ H ) < C P rog (δ H ). Finally, in R3, characterized in Corollary 1, truth revelation is achieved without the need of incentives.
By being flexible in choosing fleet buffers γ L and γ H instead of a unique γ * , the Headquarter can create operational incentives for truth revelation. These incentives increase the system's efficiency without the need of monitoring the Program's reported needs.
Corollary 2. The operational mechanism is optimal for the headquarter compared to the current system without monitoring.
In fact, the operational mechanism allows the Headquarter to achieve significant cost savings compared to the current system. These savings as well as the sensitivity analysis of the mechanism regarding the waiting cost will be illustrated in the next section.
Numerical study
This section presents a numerical study that complements the analytical insights presented in the characterization of the operational mechanism. The base case uses weekly planning for a time 
signifies that the monitoring cost is proportional to the expected fleet size under the current system. Figure 4 shows a comparison of cost for: 1) centralized benchmark; 2) current system without monitoring; 3) current system with monitoring; 4) operational mechanism.
The cost of the current system without monitoring suffers from a fleet excess caused by the inflation of transportation needs coming from the low type Program. This inflation holds for parameter 
R2 R3
1,15 1,25
Figure 4 System cost comparison values below the threshold for "natural truth revelation", T 2 . Note that the cost of the current system without monitoring is an upper bound for the cost of the system with monitoring. The greater the monitoring cost, the closer the cost of the current system with monitoring to the upper bound. The centralized benchmark is a lower bound for the current system with monitoring. The lower the monitoring cost, the closer the current system with monitoring will be to the centralized benchmark.
Also note that in R1 the mechanism does not produce significant savings compared to the current system. In this region the Headquarter offers the same fleet size to both Programs. This strategy makes the low type Program indifferent between revealing the truth and inflating its needs. In R2 the efficacy of the mechanism in terms of cost reduction increases compared to the current system. Figure 6 Fleet buffers as function of λH /λL Fleet buffers as function of q other hand, to mitigate the extra-cost of this strategy, the Headquarter simultaneously decreases the fleet buffer for the high type Program by choosing γ H < γ * (figure 6b and λ H /λ L = 1, 01 in figure 7b ). This way the Headquarter forces the indifference conditions
For low values of q in R1 both γ L and γ H are very close to γ * . When q increases, the Headquarter offers a lower γ H , which pushes down δ L . The Headquarter makes the low type Program indifferent between revealing the truth and inflating its needs by offering γ L = δ L . The extra cost of delay for the high type Program is compensated via reduction of operating cost for the fleet of the low type
Program.
In R2 the Headquarter's strategy is different. For low values of q the Headquarter gives incentives to both Program types by choosing γ
To keep the system cost balanced, the Headquarter offers the low type Program a fleet buffer greater than γ * , but decreasing in the proportion of low type Programs, q, (figure 7a). In fact, for large values of q it is more efficient for the Headquarter to offer γ revealing its true needs and inflating them by offering γ * < γ L . But the system cost is controlled by choosing γ L according to the proportion of low type Programs. The higher the proportion of low type Programs, the closer γ L is to γ * . In R3 there is no need for incentives since truth revelation is achieved naturally.
Next we perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to w. Since we do not have data on the possible cost of delay, we study the sensitivity of the system to changes in this parameter by choosing w = {100; 200; 400; 600; 800}. We also use q = {0, 025; 0, 3; 0, 5; 0, 7; 0, 975} and lambda ratios λ H /λ L = {1, 01; 1, 15; 1, 25}. The sensitivity analysis summarizes the changes in the Headquarter's optimal fleet buffer, γ * and the Program's optimal fleet buffer,γ (table 4) .
A decrease in the cost of delay, w, causes a decrease in both the optimal fleet buffer for the Headquarter, γ * and in the optimal fleet buffer for the Programγ. The lower the cost of delay, Table 4 Sensitivity of results to changes in w the lower the relative weight of the equity component of the objective function for the system. On the other hand, an increase in w increases γ * andγ. Nevertheless, these changes in the optimal fleet buffer are not linear in w. Decreasing w by 50% starting at the λ H /λ L = 1, 15 case decreases γ * by 23,24% while increasing w by 50% only increases γ * by 15,02%. Note that decreasing w expands R3, the natural truth telling region. Lower w implies that the fleet management cost for the Program is relatively higher. Hence the Program has lower incentives to distort transportation needs to secure a bigger fleet. On the other hand, increasing w slightly decreases R3.
We also summarize the changes in the natural truth telling threshold for the current system and for the operational mechanism. Our sensitivity analysis includes the cost of: 1) centralized benchmark, 2) current system without monitoring, 3) current system with monitoring, 4) mechanism.
Results are presented in table 5.
Note that the effectiveness of the mechanism compared to the current system without monitoring is increasing in w, λ H /λ L and q, as long as parameter values fall into the induced truth telling regions, R1 and R2. While the base case of w = 400, λ H /λ L = 1, 15 and q = 0, 5 leads to savings of 4, 03%, the case of w = 800, λ H /λ L = 1, 15, q = 0, 975 produces savings of 15, 16% compared to the current system without monitoring. Table 5 Sensitivity of system costs to changes in w This section presented a cost comparison between the different regimes analyzed in the paper.
It also illustrated graphically the Headquarter's strategies to achieve truth revelation using the operational mechanism. These strategies vary depending on parameter values. While in R1 the Headquarter offers the same fleet size to both Program types, in R2 the strategy consists of offering incentives to both Program types and keeping the buffer for the Program with the biggest expected proportion closer to γ * . Finally, this section included a sensitivity analysis with respect to w.
The effectiveness of the mechanism compared to the current system increases with w as long as the parameters fall into the induced truth regions. The next section presents the conclusions and possible avenues for future research.
Conclusions and Further Research
This paper studies a decentralized three party fleet management system in a humanitarian setting. to the lack of effectiveness of monitoring tools. Finally, the Programs are concerned about the lack of vehicles to respond to their transportation needs.
We find that the concerns of the three parties in the system are rational from each party's perspective. In the current fleet management system the Logistics monitoring effort does not dissuade the low type Program from inflating transportation needs. This is because of the impossibility of punishing the distorted needs stated by the Program. We also find that the optimal fleet buffer offered by the Headquarter is lower than the optimal fleet buffer intended by the Program. Hence, the lack of effectiveness of monitoring tools added to the incentive of the low type Program to inflate transportation needs produce a fleet excess that justifies the Headquarter concerns. Finally, the Program's concerns about not having enough vehicles to respond to its needs are explained by the fact that its optimal fleet buffer is greater than the one offered by the Headquarter.
Nevertheless, we find that for appropriate parameter combinations the current system has a "natural" truth telling threshold in which the centralized benchmark solution can be achieved. In The coordination of incentives is particularly challenging since financial transfer payments are not a viable way to induce Program's truth revelation in this humanitarian setting. We use this humanitarian setting to show the strategic importance of operational design, beyond the objective to achieve tactical efficiency in the humanitarian sector.
We propose a novel operational capacity based mechanism to coordinate incentives in this system.
In this mechanism the Headquarter offers different fleet buffers to the different Program types.
Additionally, the monitoring role of logistics is suppressed and the Logistics focuses on the roles of implementing the policies and procedures defined by the Headquarter. We show the existence of three mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive regions for truth revelation under the proposed mechanism. R1 is called the equal fleet size region. R2 is called the different fleet size region.
Finally, R3 is called the natural truth revelation region.
In the equal fleet size region the Headquarter achieves truth revelation by offering both Program types the same fleet size. This strategy makes the low type Program indifferent between inflating its transportation needs and revealing the truth. In the different fleet size region both Program types are offered fleet buffers greater than optimal fleet buffer for the current system. When small proportions of low type Programs are expected, the low type Program is offered a fleet buffer such that this Program's cost when inflating its needs equals the cost of revealing its true needs. When the low type probability is high enough, it is cheaper for the Headquarter to incentivize the high type Program. By offering the high type a bigger fleet buffer, the Headquarter increases the low type Program's intended fleet buffer enough to make this Program indifferent between revealing its needs and inflating them. Finally, under some parameter combination which is independent of the low type probability, the system reaches a natural truth telling region. In this region, as in the current system, the extra-cost of fleet management deters the low type Program from inflating its transportation needs. Additionally, we show that under the mechanism the high type Program always reveals his true transportation needs. This result is similar to the one we got for the current system.
Our numerical experiments complement the analysis by showing the behavior of the system due to changes in the cost of delay. As expected, a decrease in the cost of delay decreases the optimal fleet buffers for the system. An increase in the cost of delay increases the fleet buffers for the system.
It is interesting to remark that the change in the optimal fleet buffers is not linear to changes in the cost of delay. Equally, the thresholds defining the regions for truth telling are much more sensitive to decreases in the cost of delay than they are to the increases in that cost. This is because the decrease of the cost of delay makes the Program's cost function flatter rapidly, increasing the size of the natural truth revelation region.
Our paper opens a new stream of research on coordination via operational capacity based mechanism design. This is suitable to settings in which financial transfer payments cannot be used to coordinate incentives in decentralized systems.
Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: A Program of type i would report the true transportation needs if in (9) we have
. Using this fact we get the truth telling condition wQ(γ, λi) + cF (γ, λi) ≤ wQ(δi, λi) + cF (δi, λi). The proof follows from the fact that the condition for truth telling does not depend on p, the Logistics monitoring effort.
Proof of Lemma 1: Note that:
and:
Hence
Because CP rog (γ, λ) is unimodal with a finite minimum, CP rog (c, w) decreases for values of γ such that γ * (c, r, w) < γ, reaching its minimum at γ =γ(c, w). This implies γ * (c, r, w) <γ(c, w).
Proof of Proposition 2: Given the Headquarter solution
. By construction, δH < γ * .
Since ∂C P rog (γ,λ H ) ∂γ γ=γ * < 0, and due to the fact that the cost function CP rog (γ, λH ) is unimodal with minimum atγ, and given that from lemma 1 we know that γ * <γ, it follows that CP rog (γ * , λH ) < CP rog (δH , λH ). Proof of Proposition 3: Note thatγ <γL. If δL <γL, then CP rog (δL, λL) < CP rog (γ * , λL). If δL =γL, then CP rog (δL, λL) = CP rog (γ * , λL). Finally, ifγL < δL, then CP rog (γ * , λL) < CP rog (δL, λL). Hence,γL defines the truth telling region for the low type Program.
Proof of Proposition 4: First, by replacing (1) and (2) in (14) we rewrite the mechanism in extended form as:
Second, we build the mechanism's lagrangian function L.
L(γL, γH , α1, α2) = q wπ(γL) √ λL γL + (c + r)(λL + γL λL)
Where α1 and α2 are the lagrange multipliers for ICL and ICH , respectively. Third, we derive the first order conditions (FOC) of (19).
+ c and dividing by √ λL in the first equation above and dividing by √ λH in the second equation above, we can re-write the FOC as:
Note that
Replacing (22) and (23) in (20) and (21) we can re-write the FOC as:
Also, note that
follow from equation (7). These equations and the fact that λL < λH imply that
Combining the definitions of δL and δH we get the useful relation:
Equation ( Fourth, we characterize the natural induced truth telling region stated in the proposition. Characterization of R1 : Suppose 0 < α1 and 0 < α2. Note that 0 < α1 implies CP rog (γL) = CP rog (δL) and 0 < α2 implies CP rog (γH ) = CP rog (δH ).
There are three mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive possibilities: either 1) δL <γ, or 2) δL =γ, or 3)γ < δL. Subcase 1: δL <γ. Note that δL <γ implies that either δL <γ < γL or δL = γL. First, suppose that δL <γ < γL. Then, γH < δH (due to condition (31)). It also implies γH < δL <γ, and CP rog (δL) < CP rog (γH ) follows from the fact that the Program's cost function is well behaved.
For CP rog (γH ) = CP rog (λH ) to be true it must be thatγ < δH . Also, δH < γL (from condition (28)), which implies that CP rog (δH ) < CP rog (γL). But CP rog (γL) = CP rog (δL) (because we supposed 0 < α1). It follows that CP rog (δH ) < CP rog (γL) = CP rog (δL) < CP rog (γH ), which is a contradiction since α2 > 0 implies CP rog (δH ) = CP rog (γH ).
Second, suppose that δL = γL. This implies γH = δH (from condition (31)), and γH < γL follows (from condition (29)) and the fact that δL = γL). This also implies δL = γL <γ (from condition 0 < α1). Using these facts in the first order conditions (24) and (25) and adding them we get:
Equation (32) only holds in three possible cases: 1) when γL = γH = γ * , contradicting the fact γH < γL; 2) when γL < γ * < γH , contradicting the fact that γH < γL, and 3) when γH < γ * < γL. This case is feasible and leads to the condition
Subcase 2: δL =γ. This implies γL = δL =γ (since the Program cost function is unimodal). It also implies that γH = δH <γ. Using these facts in the first order conditions (24) and (25) and adding them we get again equation (32) . As in the previous subcase, this equation only holds in three possible cases: 1) when γL = γH = γ * , contradicting the fact γH < γL; 2) when γL < γ * < γH , contradicting the fact that γH < γL; and 3) when γH < γ * < γL. This leads to the condition:
Subcase 3:γ < δL. The proof for this case follows the same logic that the one for subcase 1. Note thatγ < δL implies either that γL <γ < δL orγ < δL = γL. First, suppose that γL <γ < δL. This implies δH < γH (from condition 31) and δH < γL <γ. It follows that CP rog (γL) < CP rog (δH ) (given that the Program cost function is well behaved ). Since the cost function of the program is unimodal, for CP rog (δH ) = CP rog (γH ) to hold it must be thatγ < γH < δL. This implies CP rog (γH ) < CP rog (δL). Hence we have CP rog (γH ) < CP rog (δL) = CP rog (γL) < CP rog (δH ), which contradicts the condition CP rog (γH ) = CP rog (δH ) (because we supposed 0 < α2). Second, suppose thatγ < δL = γL. This implies δH = γH . By using those relations in first order conditions (24) and (25) and adding them, we get equation (32). Following the same reasoning that we used in the two previous subcases, we find the following condition:
We can combine conditions (33), (34) and (35) in the following condition, which characterizes R1 in Proposition 4:
Note that condition (36) implies that FL = FH in region 1, which follows from replacing δL = γL in equation (26). Depending on parameter values, to make the low type Program indifferent between telling the truth and lying the Headquarter has to sacrifice some cost for the high type Program. Characterization of Regions 2 and 3: Suppose that 0 < α1 and α2 = 0. FOC (24) and (25) become:
Condition (37) have the same sign. This happens in two mutually exclusive cases: 1) γH < γ * and δL <γ simultaneously or, 2) γ * < γH andγ < δL simultaneously. First, combining condition (39) with γH < γ * and δL <γ simultaneously we get γ * < γL <γ, γH < γ * and δL <γ. We supposed 0 < α1. This implies CP rog (γL) = CP rog (δL). We also supposed α2 = 0 which implies CP rog (γH ) < CP rog (δH ). Since γL <γ and δL <γ, it must be that γL = δL. This implies γH = δH (from one of the conditions 31) and CP rog (γH ) = CP rog (δH ) follows, contradicting CP rog (γH ) < CP rog (δH ).
Second, combining condition (39) with γ * < γH andγ < δL simultaneously we get γ * < γL <γ, γ * < γH , andγ < δL. Remember the definition ofγL presented in (15). It must be thatγ <γL = δL. Otherwise, the low type Program would claim high transportation needs violating the revelation principle. It follows that: γ * < γL <γ <γL = δL, γ * < γH and δH < γH . These conditions can be divided in three sub-cases. The first Sub-case 1 is γ * < γH < γL <γ <γL = δL, δH < γH . For low values of q, these two conditions characterize R2 in Proposition 4.
The second sub-case is γ * < γL < γH <γ <γL = δL, δH < γL. The third sub-case is γ * < γL <γ < γH <γL = δL, δH < γL. For high values of q sub-cases two and three characterize R2 in Proposition 4.
Next, we show the existence of the threshold T1 in Proposition 4. Let g(γ) = wπ (γ) γ − wπ(γ) γ 2 + (c + r). Note that:
qg(γL) λL + (1 − q)g(γH ) λH ∂γH ∂γL = 0
is a required condition for the FOC of the mechanism. The justification is as follows. First, for R1 we know that γL = δL and γH = δH . Replacing these values in FOC (20) and (21) we get:
(q + α1)f (γL) − α2f (γH ) + qr = 0
(1 − q + α2)f (γH ) − α1f (γL) + (1 − q)r = 0
Solving the system for α1 and α2 we get:
q(f (γL) + r) + (1 − q)(f (γH ) + r) = 0
The equivalence between (40) and (41) follows from the fact that in (41)
. Second, for R2 we know that α2 = 0.
Hence, FOC (20) and (21) 
such that:
(1 − q)f (γH ) + q(f (γL) + r) f (γL) f (δL) + (1 − q)r = 0 q(f (γL) + r) + (1 − q)(f (γH ) + r) f (γL) f (δL) = 0
Remember the relation δL =γL in R2. Using this we get γH =
. The equivalence between (40) and (42) follows.
Keeping λL fixed, the next step is obtaining = 0, which only holds for γH = γ * . Then the solution is γL = γH = γ * . The Headquarter proposes γL = γH = γ * whenγL < δL. The explanation is as follows. Since CP rog (γ) is unimodal with minimum inγ, and γ * <γ it must be thatγ <γL. Hence 0 < ∂C P rog (γ) ∂γ γ=γ . Therefore,γ < δL implies that CP rog (γ * ) = CP rog (γ) < CP rog (δL). On the other hand, the high type Program would report its true needs since δH < γL = γ * and ∂C P rog (γ) ∂γ γ=γ * < 0 implying CP rog (γ * ) < CP rog (δH ). Proof of Proposition 5: Suppose α1 = 0 and 0 < α2. In this case the first order conditions (24) and (25) have opposite signs. This only occurs when γ * < γH <γ. Combining the first case derived from condition (46) with the case derived from condition (47) we get γL < γ * , δH <γ, and γ * < γH <γ. From condition (29) we know that δH < γL. This implies that δH < γL < γ * < γH <γ. Since δH <γ, γH <γ and CP rog (δH ) = CP rog (γH ) it must be that δH = γH , contradicting δH < γL < γ * < γH <γ. Combining the second case derived from condition (46) with the case derived from condition (47) we get γ * < γL,γ < δH , and γ * < γH <γ. This can be re-written as γ * < γH <γ < δH < γL, which implies δL <γL <γ < γL. Note that 0 < α2 implies CP rog (δH ) = CP rog (γH ). Also,γ < δH < γL implies CP rog (δH ) < CP rog (γL). On the other hand, α1 = 0 implies CP rog (γL) = CP rog (γL) < CP rog (δL). This implies δL <γ <γ < γL. But CP rog (δH ) < CP rog (γL). This implies γL < γH <γ. Then we have δL <γL < γH <γL, contradicting condition (28), which states γH < δL.
Proof of Corollary 2: In the current system without monitoring proposition 2 guarantees that the high type Program always reveals its true transportation needs. On the other hand, threshold (3) defines the truth telling condition for the low type Program. IfγL < δL, then the low type Program reveals its true transportation needs and gets F (γ * , λL) < F (γ * , λH ). This corresponds to region 3 in the mechanism. IfγL = δL, the low type Program is indifferent between revealing the truth and inflating its needs and gets F (δL, λL) = F (γ * , λH ). The same outcome can be obtained in the mechanism in region 1. Otherwise, if δL <γL, then the low type Program inflates its transportation needs and gets F (δL, λL) = F (γ * , λH ). We can always replicate this outcome with the mechanism by choosing λH < γ * < γL such that F (γL, λL) = F (γH , λH ) and F (γH , λH ) < F (γ * , λH ).
